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CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT
The warrant of attorney to confess judgment as used in the typical
judgment note has been called "the loosest way of binding a man's prop-
erty that was ever devised in any civilized country." 1 It has also been
said that "such agreements are iniquitous to the utmost, and should be
promptly condemned by the courts . .. " 2 The references are to a
power or warrant of attorney whereby the holder of a promissory note or
any other authorized person, named or unnamed, may appear in a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter, waive service of process in an
action to enforce payment of money claimed to be due thereon and confess
judgment for such amount 3 The judgment note may be found in use in
any situation in which a promissory note is ordinarily used.
4
States may be classified in three main groups in their treatment of a
warrant of attorney to confess judgment in the instrument creating the
obligation. The first group, comprising seventeen states, includes those
specifically making void any agreement to confess judgment entered into
before the commencement of suit.5 The second group of states either
1. See Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1824).
2. See First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 738, 120 S.W.
36, 42 (1909).
3. A confession clause currently in use on personal loan notes in Philadelphia
is as follows: "The undersigned do hereby authorize and empower the Prothonotary
or Clerk, or any attorney, of any court of record of Pennsylvania or elsewhere, now
or at any time hereafter, to appear for and to enter judgment against the undersigned
for the above sums, with or without declaration filed, with costs of suit, release
of errors, without stay of execution and with fifteen percent (15%) of the amount
of principal due added for attorney's fees; and the undersigned also waive the
right of inquisition on any real estate that may be levied on to collect this note, and
do hereby voluntarily condemn the same and authorize the Prothonotary or Clerk to
enter upon fi. fa. said voluntary condemnation, and the undersigned further agree
that said real estate may be sold on a fi. fa. and the undersigned hereby waive
and release all relief from any and all appraisement, stay or exemption laws of any
State, or of the United States, now in force or hereafter to be passed." Such
notes are also known as cognovit notes, from the common law form of entry
cognovit actionem relicta verificatione. Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Con-
fess Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1941).
4. The most frequent use is in the personal loan situation. However, in instal-
ment buying, where the seller wants security in addition to that provided by title
retention, it is also common to have the buyer sign a judgment note. See Cox,
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT BUYING 116-7 (1948).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 20,' § 16 (1940); Aziz. CODE ANN. § 1218 (1939); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 29-30 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.05 (1952); GA. CODE ANN.,
tit. 110, § 601 (1935); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-2906 (Burns 1946); Ky. REv. STAT.
§372.140 (1948); MASS. ANN. LAws §231-13A (1946); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§27-1434 (1938); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1545 (1942); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 13-811 (1947) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16-9 (1939) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-916, 19-
918 (1941); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8848 (Williams 1934); TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 2224 (Vernon 1950) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 1480 (1947) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5603
(1949). The Indiana and New Mexico statutes go so far as to declare the execu-
tion of a cognovit note to be a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.
See statutes cited supra. Save where the execution of the note is made a crime,
the contract is good if it can be enforced without the use of the judgment clause.
See Sales-Davis Co. v. Henderson-Boyd Lumber Co., 193 Ala. 166, 69 So. 527
(1915); Kiernan v. Jackson, 111 La. 645, 35 So. 798 (1904).
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imposes such substantial limitations on the use of judgment clauses gen-
erally as, in effect, to destroy their desirability as a speedy and inexpensive
means of entering judgment, or denies their use entirely to such groups
as small loan companies.8 Finally, there are some states which allow a
warrant of attorney, authorizing the confession of judgment at any time
and without service of process, to be signed upon execution of any instru-
ment.7 In the states of this last group, a judgment lien may be recorded
as security during the running of the obligation and-before default. While
ten states may be said to recognize the validity of a warrant of attorney
to confess judgment in the instrument creating the obligation, in only
three, including Pennsylvania, are judgment notes widely used.8
In Pennsylvania it is common practice to insert a confession of judg-
ment clause in almost every promissory note taken by any lending in-
stitution.9 Some of the notes allow confession of judgment only after
default or maturity, while others allow confession at any time after the
execution of the instrument, thereby permitting the lender to acquire a
judgment lien on the debtor's real property immediately upon the exe-
cution of the instrument.1 0 This Note will describe the use of the war-
rant of attorney to confess judgment as found in promissory notes in
Pennsylvania, indicate tle problems commensurate with such use, and
examine the desirability of confession of judgment in the light of possible
alternative security devices.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT NOTES
The term "confession of judgment" is a general one and may mean
either a judgment entered by confession in an action previously commenced
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1132 (Supp. 1953); CONN. Rv. GEN. STAT. §§ 5951,
6699 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 10-901 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 671, § 3
(1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 60, 53111 (Corrick 1949); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 6,
§ 585 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. GEN. RULES OF PR. AND PROC., JUDGMENT BY CON-
FEssION, Rule 1 (1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. §548.22 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §511.070, 511.080 (1952) ; Nm. REV. STAT. c. 25, § 1309 (1943) ; NEv. Comp.
LAWS 9§ 8805, 8806 (Supp. 1941) ; N.Y. CIV. PR. AcT §§ 540, 541; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7-247 (1944) ; N.D. REv. CODE §28-1001 (1943) ; OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 690-
692 (1937); ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 6-405, 6-407 (1940); S.C. CODE §§ 10-1535,
10-1538 (1942); S.D. CODE § 37.030 (1939); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 460.050,
460.060 (Supp. 1952) ; WYo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-3512 (1945).
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §2306 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 110, §174(5)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1952); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. §11392 (Page 1938);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §739 (Purdon 1953); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78, § 22-3
(1953); VA. CODE tit. 8, §§355, 356 (1950); Wis. SiAT. §270.69 (1951). The
following states have no statutory provisions: Colo., N.H., Me., and R.I.
8. Ill., Ohio and Pa. See Tanner, Judgment Notes of Banking Institutions, 9
Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 1110 (1941); Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess
Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1941); Note, 46 ILL. L. REv. 642 (1951).
9. See Tanner, Uniformity of Judgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 DICK. L.
REv. 173, 174 (1940). Much of the information on the use of judgment notes in
Pennsylvania was gathered through personal interviews with lending officers of
Philadelphia banks and from letters received from lending institutions and finance
companies. The letters are on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
10. For a discussion of the type of lien acquired in such a case, see text at note
50 infra.
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by the usual method of issuance and service of process or a judgment
entered on a warrant of attorney to confess judgment in an action not
previously pending." At common law, judgment by confession was per-
mitted in a pending suit, and that process is still largely regulated by com-
mon law principles. Such confession could be either by amicable action
or by adverse proceeding,' 2 but in either case it was necessary that there
should have been service of process on the defendant and suit already
started before the execution of the confession. 13 This procedure is not the
security device with which this Note is concerned.1
4
As used hereafter, confession of judgment refers to a judgment taken
by warrant of attorney included in the instrument creating the obligation
and consenting to judgment before the commencement of suit.15 The
practice is not a new one and is generally said to have existed at common
law. 16 Blackstone mentions it as being:
". .. very usual, in order to strengthen a creditor's security, for
the debtor to execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named
by the creditor, empowering him to confess judgment by either of
the ways just now mentioned [by nihil dicit, cognovit actionem or non
sum informatus] in an action of debt to be brought by the creditor
against the debtor for the specific sum due." 17
Such use of a power of attorney allowed an attorney chosen by the plaintiff
to confess judgment for the obligor without the necessity of service of
process on the latter.'8  For the added protection of the creditor, it became
customary to include, in addition to the waiver of process, a stipulation
that the defendant would not bring a writ of error or file a bill in equity to
delay judgment.' 9
11. BICK, JUDGMENT § 50 (2d ed. 1902); 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1302 (5th
ed. 1925).
12. The common law entry of judgment by confession was cognovit actionem
(he has confessed the action). 3 BL. COMM. *397.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Judgment by confession differs from judgment by default in that the former
results from the voluntary agreement of the parties and the latter from the fact
that the defendant makes no appearance. Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery
Co., 97 Tenn. 603, 37 S.W. 390 (1896).
15. "'Confession of judgment is the voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, giving by consent and without the service of process, what could otherwise
only be obtained by summons and complaint and through formal proceedings. A
person who confesses judgment consents to be sued in that form and manner. The
confession of judgment is but one of the ways and processes, one manner by which
a person is sued."' O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 44, 12 A.2d 820, 822
(1940).
16. Thomas v. Bloodworth, 44 Ga. App. 44, 160 S.E. 709 (1931); First Nat.
Bank of Kansas City v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909); see FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 1302 (5th ed. 1925). But see A. B. Farquahr Co. v. De Haven, 70
W. Va. 738, 75 S.E. 65 (1911) ; BLACK, JUDGMENT § 50 (2d ed. 1902).
17. 3 BL. CoMM. *397.
18. First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36
(1909).
19. For waivers currently included, see note 3 s.ipra.
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In a few states, the use of judgment notes has been encouraged by
legislation providing for the entry of judgment by the prothonotary or clerk
of the court for a small fee without the necessity of formal proceedingsP
Under such procedure, it is not even necessary to employ an attorney;
obviously the result is a speedy and inexpensive means of entering judgment.
Dissatisfaction with the common law practices and a desire to preserve
to the debtor his day in court led many states to invalidate, for reasons of
public policy, agreements to confess judgment executed before the com-
mencement of suit.2 ' Most other jurisdictions, rather than holding such
agreements void, impose restrictions upon them designed to protect the
debtor class from certain practices which prevailed under the prior pro-
cedure.2 2  A form of statute used in approximately one fourth of the states
requires a sworn statement by the debtor authorizing judgment to be
entered, acknowledging the sum due and stating the facts out of which the
debt arose.23  The great majority of states have adopted small loan laws
which prohibit small loan companies (licensed lenders) from accepting
a confession of judgment .
2
Where the use of judgment notes has been restricted or abolished,
such action probably resulted from dissatisfaction with conditions arising
from the speed with which entry of a confessed judgment and execution
could follow slight default.2 5 In many cases a judgment is entered on the
record without the debtor's awareness shortly after the execution of the
obligation. The lender armed with the judgment has a powerful weapon
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Purdon 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§3908 (1953); VA. CODE tit. 8, §356 (1948).
21. A typical provision of this type is found in the Tennessee statute: "Any power
of attorney to confess judgment which is given before an action is instituted and
before the service of process in such action is declared void." TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8848 (Williams 1934). See Acme Food Corp. v. Kirsch, 160 Mich. 433, 131 N.W."
1123 (1911).
22. See, e.g., MD. GEN. RULES PR. AND PROC., JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION, Rule
1 (1952), requiring notice to the debtor immediately after the entry of judgment.
The Maryland procedure also provides that any defense which the debtor has must
be presented within thirty days after he has been served with notice. The statute
thus both assures notice to the debtor and removes the contingency that the judg-
ment will be vacated after an unreasonable length of time. It should be noted,
however, that this rule does not apply where the note authorizes confession before
maturity. In such cases, notice is given as the court may direct. See Address
by John B. Gray, Jr., 46 TRANSACTIONS MD. ST. B.A. 151 (1941). See text
preceding note 26 for discussion of criticized practices.
23. These statutes are apparently patterned after the New York act. N.Y.
CIv. PR. AcT §§ 540, 541. See CAL. CODE OF Crv. PaoC. § 1132 (Deering 1953),
applied in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Codigo, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 Pac.
383 (1923).
24. See LA. Rav. STAT. tit. 6, §585 (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §23-667(12)
(1943). Connecticut has the following added prohibition: "No provision for con-
fession of judgment in any retail instalment contract or in a separate agreement
thereto shall be valid or enforceable." CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 6699 (1949).
Although the judgment note is used in Maryland, it is denied to a licensed small
loan company. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 58A, § k9 (Flack Cum. Supp.
1952). See generally, Hubacheck, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Con-
sumer Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 4 (1954); Symposium, The Small Loan
Problem in; Missouri, 16 Mo. L. REv. 195 (1951).
25. Compare, Brikhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PaoD. 78 (1941).
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in his hands. He is in a position to threaten immediate execution upon a
slight default in payment. The prospect of having his property sold at a
judicial sale is a very convincing inducement to the borrower to pay
quickly, perhaps at the sacrifice of other obligations. If a judicial sale is
necessary, the creditor may often buy the property for a very favorable
price.26
In view of the antipathy in other states toward the free use of con-
fession of judgment, Pennsylvania is conspicuous for continuing to permit
that device in the great majority of promissory notes issued there.
27
PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA
As early as 1806, Pennsylvania instituted by statute the practice of
empowering the prothonotary to enter judgment by confession upon the
presentation of an instrument in writing authorizing the holder to enter
such a judgment.28 The process of entering is quick and inexpensive once
the formal requirements of the statute are met. The warrant of attorney
must be in writing and clearly stated,29 and the judgment must be entered
for a sum which, from the face of the instrument, appears to be due.3 0
There is no requirement of service of process or notice to the obligor of
the action taken against him.81 Judgment may be entered by the original
holder or an assignee of such holder 3 2 and the employment of an attorney
is unnecessary.3 3 The statute requires neither attestation nor acknowl-
edgement 3 4 and the instrument need not be under seal. 5
26. But cf. Pa. Deficiency Judgment Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2621 (Purdon
1951), which affords relief where the property is sold to the plaintiff in execu-
tion. If he seeks a deficiency judgment for the balance due, he must first petition
the court to fix the fair market value of the realty sold.
27. Confession clauses are also used in leases of real and personal property,
instalment sales contracts, bailment leases and bonds. See Tanner, Uniformity of
J Idgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 DIcK. L. REv. 173 (1940). A new and unusual
type of confession clause has recently appeared. Because of difficulty in collecting
pledges, the managers of a voluntary subscription drive to raise money to bring
industries to Lewistown, Pennsylvania have included a confession clause in the
subscriber's pledge card.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Purdon 1953).
29. Solazo v. Boyle, 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d 179 (1950); Griffin Oil Co. v. Toms,
170 Pa. Super. 203, 85 A.2d 595 (1952).
30. Noonan, Inc. v. Hoff, 350 Pa. 295, 38 A.2d 53 (1944); Orner v. Hurwitch,
97 Pa. Super. 263 (1929) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ernst, 72 Pa. D. & C. 573 (Dauphin
County 1950); Bell v. Lawler, 45 Lack. Jur. 181 (Pa. C.P. 1944); Frederick v.
Smeltzer, 19 Leh. LJ. 378 (Pa. C.P. 1942). However, interest from the time of
demand until judgment may be added. Better Bilt Door Co. v. Oates, 165 Pa.
Super. 465, 69 A.2d 425 (1949). If judgment is entered for more than the amount
due, the judgment is not void but the excess will be stricken. Miners Savings Bank
v. Falzone, 35 Luz. L. Rep. 315 (Pa. C.P. 1941). Failure to meet the re-
quirement of stating the amount due was used as the basis of refusal to enter
judgment in Philadelphia recently when an epidemic of confession judgments on
notes 10 to 15 years old arose. Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 1, col. 2.
See text at note 95 infra.
31. O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 12 A.2d 820 (1940).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Purdon 1953).
33. Morris v. Chevalier, 20 Leh. L.J. 135 (Pa. C.P. 1933).
34. Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 79, 86 (1851).
35. Cook v. Gilbert, 8 S. & R. 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1822).
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Judgment ordinarily may not be confessed against one not a party
to the note,3 6 but amendment will be permitted to reveal the person who
actually executed the confession.3 7 Although the issue was in doubt in
Pennsylvania for some time, it now appears to be settled that judgment
may be confessed against the survivor of joint obligors.33
The authority of an agent to confess judgment on behalf of his prin-
cipal is closely scrutinized by the court.39 The power usually must be
expressly bestowed and will not be implied from the grant of other powers
unless it is necessarily incident to the performance of those powers. A gen-
eral power to operate a business and even a power to execute a promissory
note is said not to include the power to bind the principal to the drastic
procedures of a confession clause.4° The Pennsylvania Uniform Partner-
ship Act, in treating a partner as agent of the partnership for the purposes
of transactions in the ordinary course of the partnership business, specifi-
cally exempts the power to confess judgment unless that action by a partner
is authorized by the other partners.
41
The usual form of the judgment note includes waivers by the debtor
of many of the safeguards established for his protection, including invalida-
tion for procedural defects in the entry of judgment, inquisition and right
of appeal.42 All of these waivers are given effect by the Pennsylvania
courts.43 There are, however, some restrictions on what the debtor may
36. Favini v. Francine Co., 49 Lack. Jur. 69 (Pa. C.P. 1947); Girard Trust
Co. v. Cosgrove, 270 Pa. 570, 113 AtI. 741 (1921) ; Speros v. Mather, 95 Pitt. L.J.
415 (Pa. C.P. 1947). Cf. Eddy v. Smiley, 26 Pa. Super. 318 (1904).
37. Russeck v. Shapiro, 170 Pa. Super. 89, 84 A.2d 514 (1951). See also
Ulick v. Vibration Specialty Co., 348 Pa. 241, 35 A.2d 332 (1944) (judgment
may not be entered in favor of a stranger to the contract but may be so entered
in favor of the real party to the contract though the warrant be made out to a
fictitous name).
A general warrant of attorney without naming the person in whose favor
judgment might be confessed raises the conclusive presumption that it was meant
to be as broad as the obligation and therefore extended to anyone who legally ac-
quired ownership. Bautsch v. Bubbenmoyer, 32 Berks County LJ. 233 (Pa. C.P.
1941).
38. Ehnes v. Kissinger, 364 Pa. 334, 72 A.2d 65 (1950); Kingston Nat.
Bank v. Walters, 163 Pa. Super. 624, 63 A.2d 380, 10 U. OF Prr. L. Rxv. 407
(1949).
39. See Mullen v. Slupe, 360 Pa. 485, 62 A.2d 14 (1948); Armen v. Frederick,
59 Pa. D. & C. 115, 122 (Beaver County 1947).
40. Armen v. Frederick, 59 Pa. D. & C. 115, 124 (Beaver County 1947);
Payne v. Robinson, 1 Pa. Dist. 638 (Lack. County 1892).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 31(3) (d) (Purdon 1930). See Jamestown Bank-
ing Co. v. Conneaut Lake Dock & Dredge Co., 339 Pa. 26, 14 A.2d 325 (1940)
(burden of proving authority is on party asserting the judgment).
Whenever the defense raised is that the note was signed without the
authority of the purported obligor, the remedy is by petition to open, since the
defect is not apparent on the face -of the instrument. Harr v. Benmeimer, 322 Pa.
412, 185 Atl. 857 (1936). See text at note 56 infra.
42. For a typical judgment clause allowing confession of judgment at any
time, see note 3 supra.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2384 (Purdon 1951) (inquisition); Consumers
Mining Co. v. Chatack, 92 Pa. Super. 17 (1927) (right of appeal); Hazlewood
Savings and Trust Co. v. Zahniser, 78 Pitt. L.J. 332 (Pa. C.P. 1929) (procedural
defects). See Tanner, Uniformity of Judgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 Dic.
L. REv. 173, 187-91 (1940).
1954]
530 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
effectively waive. He may not forego the benefits of the bankruptcy laws,
stay of execution or the exemption of his wages from attachment.44 The
waiver of errors is not effective to defeat the debtor's right to question the
validity of the warrant or the creditor's authority to enter judgment.4
Where the warrant of attorney authorizes the entry of judgment only
after default, such default must be alleged and sworn to by the creditor
before judgment will be entered. 46 When there is an acceleration clause,
judgment may be entered for the full amount of the note by filing an
affidavit stating that the events have occurred which make the full sum
due.
47
Judgment may be entered at any time and without default where
under the terms of the instrument there is no restriction as to the time for
the entry of judgment.48  The Pennsylvania courts have said that, in such
a case, the judgment given as security may be made a matter of record
although no money is then payable and judgment cannot be executed until
default. 49 In the meantime, however, the creditor enjoys the security of a
judgment lien on the debtor's realty.
A question arises as to whether this lien is possessed of the same at-
tributes as a lien resulting from a judgment entered after litigation. It
has been held that a judgment entered as security during the running of a
debt retains priority over a judgment subsequently entered by another party
against the same debtor.50 Such a holding is necessary if the judgment
is to have much value as a security device before the maturity of the
obligation. It is the subsisting priority of the lien which affords to the
lender the protection which he desires.
The judgment note may also be used in agreements to make future
advances; here the judgment lien is kept on record as security although
the original amount may have been paid.r1 A problem of priority of liens
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (Purdon 1930); Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa.
387 (1865) (exemption of wages from attachment) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2201
(Purdon 1951) (stay of execution); May v. Merchants and Mechanics Bank, 109
Pa. 145 (1885); (waiver of bankruptcy laws held void). See Tanner, supra note
43.
45. Harr v. Furman, 34 Berks County L.J. 255 (Pa. C.P. 1942); Bell v. Austin,
34 Berks County L.J. 249 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
46. Kuhns v. Chaffee, 24 Erie County L.J. 6 (Pa. C.P. 1941) ; Lottman v. Leslie
Fay, Inc., 41 Luz. L. Reg. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1950). But see Reddy v. Kahler, 45 Sch.
L. Rec. 3 (Pa. C.P. 1948); Pasco Rural Lighting Co. v. Roland, 88 Pa. Super.
245 (1926) (judgment entered before maturity merely voidable).
47. Drey St. M. Co. v. Nevling, 106 Pa. Super. 42, 161 Atl. 880 (1932);
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Pearson, 62 Pa. Super. 425 (1916); Automobile Finance
Co. v. Varner, 90 Pitt. L.J. 169 (Pa. C.P. 1941).
48. O'Maley v. Pugliese, 272 Pa. 356, 116 Al. 308 (1922); Pacific Lumber
Co. v. Rodd, 287 Pa. 454, 135 Atl. 122 (1926); Shapiro v. Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78,
122 At!. 341 (1923) ; Harwood v. Bruhn, 313 Pa. 337, 170 At!. 144 (1934).
49. Shapiro v. Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78, 122 At!. 341 (1923); Integrity Title
Ins. Co. v. Rau, 153 Pa. 488 (1893).
50. Wrigglesworth's Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C. 566 (Clearfield County 1926).
51. Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Pa. 96 (1846); Wrigglesworth's Estate, 8 Pa. D. &
C. 566 (Clearfield County 1926) ; KLEN, JUDGMENT BY CoNFEssIoN IN PENNSYLVANIA
70, 71 (1925).
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arises when, after the recording of the judgment on the note but before
the future advances thereon are actually made, an intervening encumbrance
on the debtor's property appears. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
apparently apply the same rule to a judgment to secure future advances 52
as is applied to a mortgage used for the same purposes.53 These cases
indicate that advances made under a mortgage or judgment lien wil prevail
over an intervening lien if the advances are obligatory under the terms of
the mortgage; if the advances are merely optional, the intervening encum-
brance has priority. Thus, in this respect, the effect of a judgment as
security would appear to be similar to a mortgage.
Even though the "confession at any time" clause is the type commonly
used in Pennsylvania, as a matter of practice the larger Philadelphia banks
generally do not enter judgment until default. An exception is made in
certain cases, such as where the debtor borrows money to meet settlement
on the purchase of a new house, but has not yet sold his old house. In
such a case, the note is recorded so that upon sale of the old house, the
lender has a lien on the proceeds. The entry of judgment by lending
organizations is governed by a balance between the desire for a lien on
available land and the maintenance of the goodwill of borrowers.
The confession procedure, by reason of the fact that judgment may
be entered quickly and with no notice to the debtor or opportunity for him
to defend, could be intolerable if the courts were not reasonably liberal
in hearing attacks upon judgments already entered. Even if a valid defense
appears only occasionally, the procedure for making such a defense must be
readily available. Judgment by confession may be attacked in two ways:
by a motion to strike off or by an application to open.5 4 The former is
the proper remedy where there is a defect shown on the face of the instru-
ment.55 If no such defect appears, the proper procedure is an application
to open the judgment.5 6 The latter is the much more widely used method
and is an equitable proceeding addressed to the discretion of the court.57
Since a petition to open is an equitable procedure, the right to bring
such a petition is limited only by laches. 58 Thus, it is not necessary to
52. Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Pa. 96 (1846) ; Wrigglesworth's Estate, 8 Pa. D. &
C. 566 (Clearfield County 1926).
53. Housing Mort. Corp. v. Allied Const. Inc., 374 Pa. 312, 97 A.2d 802
(1953) (citing Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, supra note 52) ; Moats v. Thompson, 283 Pa.
313, 129 Atl. 105 (1925) (citing Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, supra note 52).
54. See Pacific Lumber Co. v. Rodd, 287 Pa. 454, 135 Atl. 122 (1926). A
motion to open a judgment waives irregularities which might have been attacked
by a motion to strike off. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Smulovitz, 159 Pa. Super. 253,
48 A.2d 57 (1946). Compare Browne v. Hoff, 4 Chest. County Rep. 103 (Pa.
C.P. 1948) with Torelli v. Hatton, 34 Del. County Rep. 206 (Pa. C.P. 1947).
55. E.g., Testa v. Lally, 161 Pa. Super. 178, 55 A2d 552 (1947) (record did
not show creditor's interest); Leader Furniture Co. v. Stoppi, 35 Scb. L. Rec.
44 (Pa. C.P. 1935) (instrument lacked authorization for confession of judgment).
56. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Rodd, 287 Pa. 454, 135 Atl. 122 (1926).
57. Deviney v. Lynch, 372 Pa. 570, 94 A.2d 578 (1953) ; Poelcher v. Poelcher,
366 Pa. 3, 76 A.2d 222 (1950).
58. Horn v. Witherspoon, 327 Pa. 295, 192 At. 654 (1937); Dormont Motors,
Inc. v. Hoerr, 132 Pa. Super. 567, 1 A.2d 493 (1938).
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attack a judgment by confession in the term in which it was entered; a
judgment has been set aside as long as eight years after its entry.59
Before opening a judgment for purposes of a trial, the court must
be satisfied that the petitioner has a valid defense sufficient to go to the
jury.60  Opposing affidavits will not be sufficient.61 Even though a ques-
tion of fact is raised, the grant or denial of a petition is a matter of dis-
cretion reviewable only for abuse thereof. 62 This may account for the fact
that confessed judgments are overthrown in a very small percentage of
cases.6
3
Unlike the situation where judgment is entered after litigation and
trial, in a confessed judgment case the defendant has had no chance to
present his dfense. His only remedy is a petition to open, and at that
stage, he should not have to produce more than what is ordinarily required
to raise a factual question for the jury. Such a requirement would not
impair unduly the efficacy of confession clauses since the creditor's lien
would still be effective as of the date on which it was originally entered.
4
The requirement of a prima facie defense would, of course, prevent baseless
litigation.
USE OF CONFESSION CLAUSES AND NEGOTIABILITY
As previously indicated two types of confession clauses as to time of
entry are found in common use: those allowing confession of judgment
only after maturity or default; and those allowing confession at any time
after the execution of the instrument. The negotiability of promissory
instruments greatly affects the extent to which they are used. It is there-
fore necessary, before discussing the use of the two types of confession
clauses, to establish how each variety of clause affects the negotiability of
the instrument in which it is found.
At common law, any instrument authorizing confession of judgment
was apparently nonnegotiable. 65 The NIL states that the negotiability of
- 59. Lorey v. Kauffman, 57 Montg. County L. Rep. 57 (Pa. C.P. 1941).
60. See Ehnes v. Mang, 170 Pa. Super. 155, 84 A.2d 518 (1951); Woods v.
Smith, 63 Dauph. County Rep. 86 (Pa. C.P. 1952). But see Holland Furnace Co.
v. Davis, 7 Sch. L. Rec. 297 (Pa. C.P. 1941), suggesting that the court will weigh
the testimony on issues of fact.
61. See Machalicka v. Lukasevic, 346 Pa. 487, 31 A.2d 164 (1943).
62. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held it to be reversible error
not to open a judgment where the undisputed evidence, if believed by a jury, would
establish a defense. Cronauer v. Bayer, 140 Pa. Super. 91, 13 A.2d 75 (1940).
63. A survey taken in Franklin County, Ohio, in 1940 showed that out of 500
cogtozit judgments over a three year period, machinery for setting aside the judg-
ment, which is similar to that in Pennsylvania, was utilized in 26 cases (5.29o).
Some of the seventeen set aside ended in settlements but in those taken to trial,
defendant was successful in only two. Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess
Juidgment, 8 Oio ST. L.J. 1, 14-6 (1941).
64. Giles v. Ryan, 317 Pa. 65, 176 Atl. 1 (1935) ; Adams v. James L. Leeds Co.,
189 Pa. 544, 42 Atl. 195 (1899); Breden v. Gilliland, 67 Pa. 34 (1870). Cf.
Joseph Helwick B. & L. v. Melnick, 361 Pa. 328, 64 A.2d 773 (1949).
65. See Milton Nat. Bank v. Beaver, 25 Pa. Super. 494 (1904).
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an instrument will not be destroyed by a stipulation for the confession of
judgment ". . . if the instrument be not paid at maturity." " As a
corollary to this provision, it has been held consistently that an authoriza-
tion of confession of judgment at any time after the execution of the note,
whether due or not, causes the note to be nonnegotiable.6 7 However, provi-
sion for acceleration and confession upon the nonpayment of an instalment
of principal or interest does not render the instrument nonnegotiable. 68
One reason given for the rule is that the possibility of confession before
maturity violates the requirement of time certainty in negotiable instru-
ments; 69 another theory advanced is that, conceptually, the note merges
into the judgment and therefore cannot be negotiable since it is attached
as an encumbrance to the debtor's land.70 Where possible, however, some
courts have attempted to find negotiability by interpreting the clause to
allow confession only after maturity.71 A lender interested in negotiability
is therefore effectively limited to a clause permitting confession of judgment
only after maturity. Pennsylvania banks use both the negotiable and the
nonnegotiable type note, taking into consideration the nature of the trans-
action in balancing the advantages of negotiability against the desirability
of obtaining an immediate judgment lien as collateral security. 2
As has been noted, the use of the confession clause has become stand-
ard in almost all loans made by any lending institution in Pennsylvania.78
Outside of Philadelphia, the confession clause is used in almost all loans
made commercially in Pennsylvania and usually provides for confession
at any time. In the case of personal consumer loans, the notes are not
often transferred, and when they are, an assignment will suffice since
66. NIL §5(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §7 (Purdon 1930). The same rule
will prevail under the Uniform Commercial Code, which adopts in substance the
NIL provision. UCC § 3-112(1) (d) (Official Draft 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 3-112(1) (d) (Purdon 1953). The NIL in Georgia omits § 5(2) but that
state does not allow confession of judgment before suit has been started. GA. CODE
ANN. § 110-601 (1937). The Illinois Act omits the words "if the instrument be
not paid at maturity" thus making negotiable a note providing for confession before
maturity. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 98, §25 (Smith-Hurd 1953). See Note, Conferssion
of Judgment and Time Certainty in a Negotiable Instrument, 46 ILL. L. Rnv. 642
(1951).
67. Shinn v. Stemler, 158 Pa. Super. 350, 45 A.2d 242 (1946); Sine v. Way-
choff, 123 Pa. Super. 334, 187 Ati. 234 (1936); Volk v. Shoemaker, 229 Pa. 407,
78 Atl. 933 (1911). See BRANNAN, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 289 (7th ed.,
Beutel, 1948); Note, 117 A.L.R. 673 (1938).
68. Interstate Contracting Co. v. Mager, 51 Pa. D. & C. 113 (Pike County
1943).
69. NIL §§ 1(3), 4; see Wooleyhan v. Green, 34 Del. 503, 155 AtI. 602 (Super.
Ct. 1931).
70. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846).
71. United States v. Nagorney, 28 F. Supp. 298 (D. Kan. 1939) ("for such
amount as may appear to be unpaid" interpreted to mean "due and unpaid");
Edelen v. First Nat. Bank, 139 Md. 422, 115 Atl. 602 (1921) ("such sum as may be
due" held to allow confession only after maturity).
72. Perhaps the advantages of both may be achieved by the use of two notes,
one being a one-day note. See text following note 74 infra.
73. See note 27 supra. Much of the information to follow was gathered from
personal interviews and letters from banks and finance companies doing business
in Pennsylvania.
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defenses available even against the original lender are rare.74 The lender
feels that he needs the security offered by the note permitting confession
at any time, and in practice the judgment is actually entered at once in
most cases in smaller communities. Entry of judgment may be forborne
in certain cases in order to retain the goodwill of the borrower. Otherwise,
the judgment is entered and the lien acquired before maturity. In these
instances, the fact that "confession at any time" clauses render the instru-
ments nonnegotiable apparently is outweighed by the security value of the
confession clause.
In Philadelphia, the practice varies with the size of the lending in-
stitution. A survey of the larger banks shows that the custom is to use
a clause providing for confession only at or after maturity, thus preserv-
ing negotiability. However, such a note may be combined with a one-day
note which the borrower also signs and which may be entered the next
day as security. In this way, the lender may acquire a lien during the
running of the debt simply by entering judgment the next day on the one-day
note. This may or may not be done depending on the confidence of the
lending officer in the individual borrower. Officers of the larger banks
report that default on personal loans -serious enough to consider legal
action occurs in less than one percent of the -cases and, in these, judgment
is entered only in cases where it is thought that the debtor has sufficient
unencumbered property on which to levy.
Smaller loan and finance companies use a "confession at any time"
clause in all their personal loans and record the judgment before maturity
in cases where the lien is thought necessary. However, in all cases of
default, judgment is entered. Even if there are no assets on which to
levy, the in terrorem effect of the judgment is a useful tool in coercing pay-
ment. With the small companies, the default rate is approximately two
percent,75 which is higher than with the banks. This is to be expected
since the small company is more willing to lend to the marginal borrower
who may not be able to get credit at the bank.
The "confession at any time" note, when recorded, shows a judgment
against the borrower even though he has not defaulted or even indicated
that he will default. The ensuing effect on his credit might tend to deter
commercial borrowers in Philadelphia from signing such a note. However,
the present practice in Philadelphia is to make a notation in the judgment
rolls to the effect that judgment has been entered as security before default.
The lien still exists but the credit position of the judgment debtor is
clarified.
The usual bailment lease, as used in Pennsylvania to finance con-
sumer buying, contains a judgment note. However, the right of reposses-
sion is the method first used when there is a default in the instalment pay-
74. Although there are many possible defenses, e.g., forgery, fraud, payment,
invalid assignments and endorsements, usury, etc., it is in comparatively few cases
that a judgment could be successfully defeated. See note 63 supra.
75. Default as used here refers to default warranting legal action against the
borrower. Minor delays in payment may occur in as many at 20% of the cases.
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ments. If repossession and sale still leave a deficit, a deficiency judgment
is entered; this is done by confession. The confession clause in the bail-
ment lease provides for confession only after default. Such consumer
credit paper is usually negotiated to the bank by the dealer soon after he
acquires it. Under the NIL the bank has been held to be a holder in due
course so that it may collect from the buyer on the note free of any breach
of warranty defense.76 Thus, the buyer finds himself in the position of
having to pay for goods which may be unsatisfactory while at the same
time he is unable to withhold payment as a means of forcing the dealer to
provide service. Pennsylvania has corrected this evil in regard to auto-
mobiles through the Motor Vehicle Finance Act.7 7 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides some relief by allowing the buyer to exert his
defense of breach of warranty where the holder in due course proceeds
under the security agreement.7 8 Thus, the bank is denied the quick remedy
of repossession unless it is willing to subject itself to the buyer's defenses.
However, by proceeding on the note the bank can still avoid these defenses
and where, as in Pennsylvania, confession of judgment is permissible will
still have available a rapid method of effecting a judgment lien.
ALTERNATIVE SECURITY DEVICES
Confession of judgment clauses have proved to be highly desirable
security devices whereby creditors have been able to protect themselves
with quick and inexpensive judgment liens. Yet the hardship to debtors
attendant to the use of these clauses has compelled many states to prohibit
them entirely or to place serious limitations on their use. There remains
to be considered the availability of alternative security devices, particularly
those which have been maintained by states rejecting or limiting the con-
fession of judgment clauses.
At first glance, it would seem that since the recordation of a judgment
note is used to secure a lien on realty during the running of a debt, a ready
substitute would be a mortgage. This similarity to a mortgage is magnified
by the treatment of loans secured by judgments as real estate loans for
some purposes. 79 However, the mortgage is not a real substitute since
76. NIL §3(2). See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 253 et seq.
(7th ed., Beutel, 1948) ; Sutherland, Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 230, 235.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(6) (Purdon Supp. 1953). "No installment
sale contract shall require or entail the execution of any note or series of notes by
the buyer, which when separately negotiated, will cut off as to third parties any
right of action of defense which the buyer may have against the original seller."
Cf. UCC § 9-201 (Official Draft 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-201 (Purdon
1953).
78. UCC § 9-206(1) (Official Draft 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-206(1)
(Purdon 1953). See Sutherland, Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 230, 235.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-1012 (Purdon Supp. 1952). "A bank or bank
and trust company shall have the power to lend on the security of, or invest in,
judgments of record which are first liens on unencumbered real property situated
within the Commonwealth, to the amount of fifty per centum of the actual value
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it is best suited for long term loans and involves many incidental expenses.80
Also, the judgment note finds frequent use where there is no realty upon
which a mortgage could operate.
The most common devices in use in states in which judgment notes are
not found are garnishment and assignment of wages. Garnishment, the
process which has been used to obtain the debtor's wages while they are
still in the hands of the employer, is allowed in most states, with exemp-
tions ranging from $67.50 per months' to 80% of the debtor's wages.8 2
A few states prohibit garnishment, s8 while extraordinary execution proceed-
ings in the nature of garnishment are available in others.8 4 Garnishment
proceedings may be devastating both in actual use and as an in terrorem
weapon. Tying up the wages of a working man not infrequently results
in financial disaster to the borrower.85 In addition, the mere threat of
garnishment is a strong sanction because of the possibility that employers
will discharge employees against whose wages garnishment is issued.
These factors and the charging of usurious interest rates necessitate the
small loan regulations which now exist throughout the nation.8 6
Assignment of wages for the future may be the subject of even greater
abuse. Through such a device, a debtor may sign away his livelihood far
into the future in a never ending attempt to become solvent. The business
of "salary buying" was one of the greatest evils of the days of the "loan
shark." 87 At present, wage assignments are allowed with varying restric-
tions in all but four states.8  Restrictions take the form of exemptions of
up to 90% on small loans,8 9 or the denial of wage assignments to licensed
lenders.90
of such property, under the same circumstances and subject to the same conditions
as are established by this section in the case of loans on the security of, or invest-
ments in, bonds secured by mortgages upon real property."
80. See Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. of Lives v. Watt, 151 F2d 697 (5th Cir.
1945) (discussion of mortgage foreclosure procedure in Pennsylvania); KLEIN,
JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION IN PENNSYLVANIA 69, 70 (1929). Among the expenses
incidental to a mortgage are recording fees and the costs of title searches and in-
surance.
81. Ky. REv. STAT. §427.010 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1953).
82. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3897 (1949).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (Purdon 1930); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7711,
7712 (Williams 1934); Tzx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
84. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§2A:17-50, 2A:17-53 (1952); CoNN. REv. GEN.
STAT. § 8102 (1949). Both states provide that after judgment and in aid of execu-
tion, the creditor may secure an order attaching the debtor's wages.
85. See Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAW & CoNTEmP.
PaoB. 78 (1941).
86. Symposium, The Loan Shark Problem Today, 19 LAW & CoNTEmp. PRo. 1
et seq. (1945). Compare Symposium, Combating the Loan Shark, 8 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PROB. 1 et seq. (1941).
87. See Birkhead, supra note 85.
88. OHIo GEN. CoDE §6346(13) (Page 1938); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §8102
(1949); ALA. CoDE tit. 39, § 201 (1940); Mo. Ray. STAT. § 432.030 (1952).
89. CoLO. STAT. AN. c. 88, §38b and c. 97, §223(1) (Cum. Supp. 1952).
90. MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAWs art. 58A, § 19 (Flack 1951).
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Both garnishment and assignment of wages were the cause of hard-
ship to the laborer and his family before the widespread adoption of small
loan laws. In abolishing such devices,9 ' Pennsylvania has avoided many
problems which have caused a great deal of difficulty in other jurisdic-
tions while still allowing to creditors an important security device in the
form of confession of judgment.
The procedure in Maryland affords an example of a modified con-
fession of judgment without service of process although it is denied to
small loan and finance companies. 92 The Maryland rules 9- require that
notice be given to the debtor immediately upon the entry of judgment. The
advantage of quick consummation of the judgment and the protection of
the creditor against possible delays and fraudulent transfers was thought
to outweigh the desirability of giving the debtor advance notice.94 As a
corollary of the notice requirement, defendant is given thirty days after
service in which to move to vacate the judgment. After that time, the
judgment becomes final.
The Maryland procedure aids the creditor by requiring the debtor to
act promptly and at the same time gives notice to the debtor so that he
may present his defense when the evidence is likely to be readily available.
The adoption of such a procedure would correct the lack of notice in the
Pennsylvania procedure and would apparently work to the benefit of both
parties. However, it would still leave the debtor at a disadvantage as
regards defenses arising from concealed fraud or defects which would not
come to light until long after the judgment had been entered.
CONCLUSION
Confession of judgment clauses take on added significance in Penn-
sylvania since garnishment and assignment of wages are forbidden. In
most states which have abolished judgment notes, garnishment of wages
is permitted. In some other states where garnishment is not permitted,
failure to meet court ordered payments may result in punishment for
contempt. Although it is possible that abuses could arise in the use of
confession of judgment clauses, if, indeed, they do not already exist in
Pennsylvania, it is questionable whether borrowers are in a more disad-
vantageous position than they would be if creditors were allowed the secu-
rity devices granted them by many of the states which outlaw confession
clauses.
91. Attachment: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §886 (Purdon 1930). See Hollander
v. Kressman, 143 Pa. Super. 32, 17 A.2d 669 .(1941); Burry & Merkle Co. v.
Benscotter, 66 Pitt. L.J. (Pa. C.P. 1918). Attachment of wages is allowed in
claims for board. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 621 (Purdon 1930).
Assignment: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 271 (Purdon 1952).
92. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 11, § 198, art. 58A, § 19 (1951).
93. MD. GEN. RuLEs OF PR. AND PRoc., JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION, Rule 1,
superseding MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art 26, § 6 (1951).
94. 46 TRANSAC0NoS MD. ST. B.A. 151 (1941).
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A possible alternative is to abolish all of the above aids to collection
and leave the creditor to his remedy of suing on the note. It is the con-
tention of the lending institutions that such a step would result in a severe
curtailment of credit. Such an argument is effective only while the lending
agencies police themselves efficiently enough so that the abuses possible
from a judgment note do not become widespread. Fear of adverse public
opinion is an important motivating factor in this respect.
In the absence of abuse, the judgment note affords a speedy and
efficient means of entering judgment quickly on claims which in the great
majority of cases cannot be successfully defeated. However, the ever
present possibility of abuse should not be ignored. The recent experience
of a number of Philadelphia citizens is illustrative. The persons involved
had purchased automobiles in the late 1930's or early 1940's and financed
payment by signing judgment notes. Before payment the purchasers re-
turned the cars to the finance company in the belief that the outstanding
debts were in that way satisfied. However, the debtors neglected to have
the notes cancelled. In the latter part of 1953, the company which had
acquired the notes commenced levying execution on the property of the
debtors, many of whom paid the amount demanded under threat of judicial
sale of their property.9 The fact that the present law allows such latitude
to an unscrupulous lender is a cause for concern. Enforcement agencies
are powerless to combat such tactics and are indeed duty bound to assist
the judgment creditor. If the influence of public opinion should fail to
deter such activity, legislative curtailment of the use of confession of judg-
ment is necessary, perhaps to the detriment of many honest lenders.
95. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 18, 1954, p. 1, col. 2; id., Jan. 29, 1954, p. 1,
col. 1; id., Jan. 30, 1954, p. 1, col. 2.
